Peace and Environment News* November 1992
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Peace and Environment News * November 1992 |
by Alan Dixon
Ottawa resident Alan Dixon is working with Peace Brigades International in El Salvador. Last month he explained the history of the civil war that ended with peace accords signed January 16. The conclusion of his report explains the accords and how they are being implemented. On November 1, Alan Dixon will be in Ottawa to discuss the work he has done in El Salvador. See Peace and Environment Calendar for details.
The Peace Accord signed in Chapultepec, Mexico by the government of El Salvador and FMLN guerilla leaders has nine chapters, of which the first five refer primarily to government commitments to changes in the political, economic and social conditions of the country.
The first two chapters, Armed Forces and National Civilian Police, are intended to remove the teeth of the Armed Forces, a tricky and dangerous manoeuvre. The Accord limits the Armed Forces' constitutional mandate to territorial defense within the strict observance of human rights. Responsibility for public security is given exclusively to a new civilian police force, whose structure tries to guarantee its political impartiality. In addition, the existing Armed Forces officer corps is to be reviewed for human rights violations by an impartial commission, the army's size is to reduced by half, and various structures within the Army are to be eliminated, such as the anti-insurgency battalions and the intelligence services.
The next three chapters deal with longer term reforms of the judicial, electoral, social, and economic systems. Reforms in these areas will be the focus of the struggle for peace and justice once (hopefully) the repressive state apparatus is dismantled.
Stopping the war
Chapters six and seven, which deal with the political participation of the FMLN and the cease-fire and separation of forces, show how to stop a shooting war. In these sections, the government commits itself to providing political space and safety guarantees for the excombatants and supporters of the FMLN so that they can continue to express their political ideas. The government will also provide economic programs to help the excombatants reintegrate into society. The FMLN commits itself to gradually demobilizing its combatants by 20 percent (about 1500) a month over the course of the transition period. It also agrees to register and eventually hand over all its weapons to U.N. observers.
Chapter eight details the role of the UN. This includes the military observers that accompany the FMLN camps, the police observers that accompany the National Police until the new civilian police force can begin operation, and the human rights division. Finally chapter nine gives a detailed calendar of how all these accords fit together, when each part needs to be completed, and by whom.
The rocky road to compliance
News of the Accord in January provoked jubilation as well as scepticism in the population. Frequently invoked was a Salvadoran saying that the paper lasts as long as what's written on it. It seemed unlikely that the repressive elements of the Armed Forces would quietly allow themselves to lose power.
Considering the degree of foreign involvement in the negotiation and signing of the accords, it is not surprising that foreign participation has been necessary for its implementation. Marrack Goulding, U.N. Subsecretary for Peace Operations, came to talk with the government and the FMLN in mid-March, in the middle of a crisis over land tenancy, and again in mid-August, in the midst of a wave of assassinations and following another delay in the FMLN's demobilization of its excombatants.
Most of the delays in implementation have been formally the responsibility of COPAZ, the commission set up to oversee many of the Accords. This commission has representation from the government, the FMLN, and the six major political parties, as well as observers from the church and the U.N. Problems resulting from lack of resources and infrastructure, an excess of responsibilities, and a lack of time to deal with them all have been compounded by political manoeuvering. COPAZ has often has been ignored by the government and the FMLN, who have resorted to direct negotiations to resolve difficulties.
The first major crisis came on March 2, when the government was to "suppress" the old Treasury Police and National Guard, but instead just changed their names, leaving them intact in their old buildings. This was finally resolved in late June after a series of direct government-FMLN negotiations. The four month delay in the beginning of the new National Civilian Police Academy also looks suspiciously political.
Attitudes ambivalent
The FMLN has repeatedly claimed that it is prepared to comply with all of its responsibilities when the government has completed its part. This is certainly justifiable, considering the non-symmetrical nature of the Accord, which sets up conditions to allow the FMLN to reintegrate into the life of the country. Nevertheless, the government's claim that the FMLN does not really want to demobilize also has a grain of truth. It is only to be expected that many of the combatants are unprepared and unwilling to lay down their weapons and return to a civilian life. On the whole, however, these claims are exaggerated, presumably to obscure the government's own failures to comply. Except in the unlikely event of a coup or major massacre, the FMLN's possibilities of returning to armed struggle are basically none, and they have no interest in upsetting the peace process.
The government's attitude towards the Accord is somewhat more ambivalent. Obviously, they are most interested in the demobilization of the FMLN, and they view the rest of the reforms as a necessary evil which they will comply with to the degree that they have too. But the powerful land oligarchy with their military allies are still against the Accords. It is not clear at this point whether they see the Accords as merely a temporary inconvenience until the FMLN have been disarmed, or whether, like the civilist wing of the ruling party ARENA, they have begun to change their thinking and ways of doing things. In any case, President Cristiani and his government are still dependent on this sector.
A qualified success
In the short term, it is clear that El Salvador's Peace Accord has been a success. The cease-fire has entered the Guiness Book of World Records as the longest ever. The almost universal consensus within El Salvador is that the country will not return to war. During this transition period the politicians and the forces that they represent have become ever more committed to the primarily economic interests that brought a negotiated end to the war.
What has been going on in El Salvador since January is that precious first step towards peace that begins with a cessation of hostilities in an atmosphere of mutual trust. The next step, to change the conditions that gave rise to the war, has been clearly laid out by the Accord, but will clearly not be completed by the end of October, although there has been remarkable progress.
Possibilities for the future
How far will it go? Much will depend on the degree to which the old groups and structures of oppression and violence adapt to the new rules. In a worst case scenario, the country will continue in its current state of uncertainty and fear, and the demilitarization process will stagnate.
Much will also depend on the ability of the FMLN and its supporters to elaborate a viable economic and political alternative in time for the 1994 elections and to organize the majority of the population in support of the Accords. In an optimistic scenario, the areas of the country that were in the FMLN's zones of control will provide a model of development for the rest of the country.
Finally, there's the unknown factor of external influences—U.S. political and economic interests, the changing role of the U.N., and the availability of world markets for El Salvador's products.
If it does work, the Salvadoran Peace Accord will be one of the few successful negotiated solutions to the many civil wars of this world. Even as it stands, it's a tremendous gift to the long suffering population of El Salvador, and a powerful example to the rest of the world.
Converted April 6, 2001 - Lg
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